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Critical infrastructure networks are a key ingredient of modern society. We discuss a general
method to spot the critical components of a critical infrastructure network, i.e. the nodes and the
links fundamental to the perfect functioning of the network. Such nodes, and not the most connected
ones, are the targets to protect from terrorist attacks. The method, used as an improvement analysis,
can also help to better shape a planned expansion of the network.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 89.75.Fb, 89.20.Hh, 89.40.-a
The attacks of September 11 2001 have raised in all
its urgency the problem of protecting critical infrastruc-
tures from terrorist attacks. The US President’s Com-
mission on Critical Infrastructures Protection [1] has de-
fined five different categories of critical infrastructures:
1) information-communication, 2) banking and finance,
3) energy (e.g. electric, oil, gas), 4) physical distribu-
tion (including transportation), 5) vital human services
(including water supply). In this paper we propose a
general method to find the critical components of a criti-
cal infrastructure network [2]. By critical components we
mean the nodes and the edges crucial to the best func-
tioning of the network, and therefore the strategic points
of the network to improve or to protect from terrorist
attacks. Recently, attacks on artificially generated ran-
dom and scale-free topologies and on real-world networks
have been studied intensively. In the literature appeared
so far the attacks were simulated as the deliberate re-
moval either of nodes [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] or of links [4, 8, 9]
of the network. The rationale of our method is different
from the previous ones: instead of sorting and removing
the nodes in descending order of degree [3, 4, 5, 6] or be-
tweenness [4, 6, 7], and the edges in descending order of
betweennes [4, 8] or range [9], we measure the importance
of an element of the network by the drop in the network’s
performance caused by the deactivation of that element.
In practice we check for the redundancy of an element
by calculating the performance of the perturbed network
and comparing it with the original one. The element can
be a single node or edge, or a group of nodes and edges if
we want to simulate multiple attacks. In this way we de-
fine the vulnerability of the network under a given class
of attacks and we produce a list of the points of the net-
work that should be the first concern of any policy of
protection from terrorist attacks. Analogously, we mea-
sure the importance of an improvement by the increase in
the network’s performance caused by such improvement.
The paper is organized as follows: we first present the
general framework to define critical damages, critical im-
provements, structural vulnerability and improvability of
a critical infrastructure. We then show how the method
works in practice on some examples of communication
and transportation critical infrastructures.
We assume that a generic critical infrastructure S is
characterized by a single variable Φ[S] > 0, the perfor-
mance of S [10]. The definition and quantitative analysis
of the critical components of S, we propose in this paper,
uses, as reference observable, variations in the perfor-
mance ∆Φ. We consider separately the study of damages
and of improvements.
Attacks analysis. Let us indicate by D a set of
possible damages on the infrastructure S, and with
DAMAGE(S, d) a map that gives the infrastructure re-
sulting from S after the damage d ∈ D. We mea-
sure the importance of the damage d by the relative
drop in performance ∆Φ−/Φ, with ∆Φ− = Φ[S] −
Φ[DAMAGE(S, d)] ≥ 0, caused by d. In particular, the
critical damage d∗ ∈ D is the damage ofD that minimizes
Φ[DAMAGE(S, d)]. The vulnerability V of S under the
class of damages D can be defined as:
V [S,D] =
Φ[S]−W [S,D]
Φ[S]
(1)
where W [S,D] = Φ[DAMAGE(S, d∗)] is the worst per-
formance of S under the class of damages D. The vul-
nerability V [S,D] is defined in the range [0,1].
Improvements analysis. We now turn our at-
tention into how to improve an existing infrastructure
[11]. Various improvements can be added to S, so
given a set of improvements I we define, for any im-
provement i ∈ I, the map IMPROV E(S, i) that gives
the resulting infrastructure obtained after the improve-
ment i. We measure the importance of i as the rela-
tive increase in the performance ∆Φ+/Φ, with ∆Φ+ =
Φ[IMPROV E(S, i)] − Φ[S], caused by i. In particular
2we define the critical improvement i∗ as the best possible
improvement in I, i.e. the improvement of I that maxi-
mizes Φ[IMPROV E(S, i)]. Then, the improvability IM
of S under the class of improvements I can be defined as:
IM [S, I] =
B[S, I]− Φ[S]
Φ[S]
(2)
where B[S, I] = Φ[IMPROV E(S, i∗)] is the best perfor-
mance of S under the class of improvements I.
As a practical application of the method we consider
communication-information (as the Internet [12]) and
transportation infrastructure networks. We represent the
infrastructure network S as a valued [13] undirected [14]
graph with N nodes (for instance the routers in the In-
ternet, or the stations in a railway transportation sys-
tem) and K links (the cables connecting two routers,
or the lines connecting couples of stations). S is de-
scribed by the N × N adjacency matrix {lij}. If there
is a link between node i and node j, the entry lij is a
positive number measuring the link latency, otherwise
lij = +∞. For instance, in the Internet (in the rail-
way system) the larger lij is, the longer it takes for a
unitary packet of information (a train) to go along the
link from i to j. We have now different ways to mea-
sure the performance of S. In this paper we identify the
performance of S with the efficiency of the network i.e.
we assume: Φ[S] = E[S] ≡ 1
N(N−1)
∑
i6=j∈S
1
dij
, where
dij is the smallest sum of the links latency throughout
all the possible paths in the graph from a node i to a
node j (in the particular case of unvalued graphs dij re-
duces to the minimum number of links traversed to get
from i to j). The efficiency is a quantity recently intro-
duced in refs.[15] to measure how efficiently the nodes of
the network communicate if they exchange information
in parallel. A second possibility is to assume the perfor-
mance Φ[S] to be equal to the inverse of the characteristic
path length L ≡ 1
N(N−1)
∑
i6=j∈S dij [15, 16]. An alter-
native possibility to avoid the shortest path assumption
on which both E and L rely, is to identify Φ[S] with the
mean flow-rate of information over S [17].
Ca*net3 We show how the method works in prac-
tice by considering the Ca*net3 IS-IS routing network
[18] represented in fig.1, a simple example of an Internet
backbone, consisting of two main routes, OC-12 and OC-
48, N = 13 routers and K = 14 links. As the backbone
has diverse routes of different bandwidths, the preferred
path between any two routers is the path which presents
the least amount of latency under normal router load
conditions. We consider three different classes (sets) of
damages D: the damage of a single cable connection,
of a single Internet router, and of a couple of routers.
DAMAGE(S, d) is the network we obtain from S after
the deactivation of the damaged component (respectively
the damaged link, node or couple of nodes). The dam-
age of single links allows to investigate the finer effects
on the network, since the damage of a node implies the
damage of a number of links equal to the node’s degree.
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FIG. 1: Ca*net3 IS-IS routing network. The numbers re-
ported are a measure of the latency associated to each link
[18].
The entity of the damage d is given by the relative drop
in the efficiency ∆Φ−/Φ[S] caused by d.
As class of improvements I we consider the effect of
adding a new link (the addition of groups of links will
be considered in [19]). IMPROV E(S, i) is the network
we obtain from S after the addition of the new link.
The results shown in table I indicate that the connec-
tion Winnipeg2-Winnipeg1 is by far the most important
one since it is crucial for the correct interplay of the OC-
12 and OC-48 routes. The routers Winnipeg1 and Win-
nipeg2 are respectively the first and the second in the
list of the most important nodes. Conversely when two
nodes are removed at once, the couple Winninipeg1 +
Montreal produces a larger effect than the couple Win-
nipeg1 + Winnipeg2 which is only the tenth in the list
(not in table) with ∆Φ−/Φ = 0.570. Concerning the
improvement analysis, the best links to add are long ca-
bles bridging two different parts of the network, as for
instance Toronto-NYC or Winnipeg1-Toronto.
Infonet As a second example we study the Internet
backbone of Infonet[20], as of September 2001. The net-
work of Infonet has N = 94 nodes and K = 96 cable
connections and carries about the 10% of the traffic over
US and Europe. It consists of two main parts, the US and
the European backbone respectively with N1 = 66 and
N2 = 28 nodes, connected by three overseas cables. In
table II we consider the same classes of damages and im-
provements as in the previous example. The vulnerability
of Infonet under single link damages is V = 0.379, with
NYC-New Jersey being the critical link damage. Such a
link plays in the network a role similar to red bonds in
percolation [21]. In fact the removal of such a link will
result in a break up of the network into two disconnected
parts of about the same size, with a decrease of the 38% in
the performance of the network. Notice that the second
highest link damage produces only a drop of 23% in the
performance. Other important links are those connecting
New-Jersey with Chicago, with San Jose and with Dal-
3TABLE I: Attacks and improvement analysis of Ca*net3. For
each class of damage/improvement considered (see text) we
report the cases having the highest effects on the performance
of the network. Rank and name of the damaged link (node,
or couple of nodes, respectively) and of the added link are
listed in the first two columns. The relative drop or increase
of the efficiency is in the third column.
Damaged link ∆Φ−/Φ
1 Winnipeg2 - Winnipeg1 0.358
2 Ottawa - Montreal 0.146
3 Montreal - Fredericton 0.123
4 Seattle - Vancouver 0.098
Damaged node ∆Φ−/Φ
1 Winnipeg1 0.466
2 Winnipeg2 0.408
3 Montreal 0.317
4 Ottawa 0.220
Damaged couple of nodes ∆Φ−/Φ
1 Winnipeg1 + Montreal 0.792
2 Winnipeg1 + Ottawa 0.723
3 Winnipeg2 + Montreal 0.702
4 Winnipeg2 + Ottawa 0.700
5 Winnipeg2 + Toronto 0.633
Added Link ∆Φ+/Φ
1 Toronto - NYC 0.01237
2 Ottawa - NYC 0.00770
3 Winnipeg1 - Toronto 0.00587
4 Fredericton - NYC 0.00546
5 Winnipeg2 - Toronto 0.00514
6 Seattle - Calgary 0.00508
las, and some links in the east cost as NYC-Washington
and Washington-Atlanta. The links in table, ordered ac-
cording to ∆Φ−/Φ, have also a decreasing betweenness
b, another measure of link centrality [13] defined as the
number of times the link is in the shortest paths connect-
ing couples of nodes [8]. Nevertheless, the correlation be-
tween ∆Φ/−Φ and b is not perfect: for instance the link
NYC-Amsterdam, with the second highest betweenness,
ranks only 14th according to ∆Φ−/Φ. The vulnerabil-
ity under damages of single nodes (couples of nodes) is
V = 0.573 (V = 0.723). New Jersey and NYC are by
far the two most important nodes: the damage of either
one would disconnect the US from the European back-
bone, reducing by more than 50% the performance of the
network. The damage of both nodes at once reduces by
more than 70% the network performance. The damage
analysis of other networks [22] shows that the link NYC-
New Jersey and the nodes NYC and New Jersey play
an important role also in other Internet backbone maps.
Such result might explain the significant drop in perfor-
mance, marked by increased packet loss and difficult in
reaching some Web Sites (in particular in the connection
from US to Europe), experienced by the Internet in the
aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks. In fact
the stress the US Internet infrastructure was subjected to
was the greatest encountered over its 32-year history and
was probably related to the damages of Internet routers
TABLE II: Attacks and improvement analysis of Infonet 2001
[20], as of September 2001. Same as in table I. In the last
column we report the betweenness b of the removed edge, the
degree k of the removed node, and the sums of the degrees of
the two removed nodes.
Damaged link ∆Φ−/Φ b
1 NYC-New Jersey 0.379 2205
2 New Jersey-Chicago 0.229 1185
3 NYC-Washington 0.197 1185
4 Washington-Atlanta 0.183 1120
5 New Jersey-San Jose 0.179 984
6 New Jersey-Dallas 0.122 609
Damaged node ∆Φ−/Φ k
1 New Jersey 0.573 9
2 NYC 0.530 9
3 Chicago 0.280 15
4 Amsterdam 0.241 9
5 Atlanta 0.227 14
6 Washington 0.203 2
Damaged couple of nodes ∆Φ−/Φ k1 + k2
1 NYC + New Jersey 0.723 17
2 New Jersey + Amsterdam 0.710 18
3 New Jersey + Atlanta 0.707 23
4 New Jersey + Frankfurt 0.689 20
5 NYC + Chicago 0.685 24
6 New Jersey + Washington 0.673 11
Added Link ∆Φ+/Φ
1 New Jersey-Atlanta 0.0522
2 Chicago-Atlanta 0.0481
3 NYC-Atlanta 0.0437
4 San Jose-Atlanta 0.0395
5 Dallas-Atlanta 0.0341
6 Chicago-Amsterdam 0.0339
7 NJersey-Amsterdam 0.0329
8 NYC-Chicago 0.0326
9 Atlanta-Amsterdam 0.0318
10 Chicago-Frankfurt 0.0316
11 Atlanta-Frankfurt 0.0296
and cables in the south of NYC [23].
The comparison of our measure with the node degree k
[13] i.e. with the number of links incident with the node,
(see tab.II) shows that the damage of the most connected
nodes, the hubs [3], is not always the worst damage. In
fact, the damage of Chicago, the node with the highest
k, produces only a drop of 28% in the performance of
the network, while the damage of Chicago and Atlanta,
the couple with the highest number of links (29) gives
∆Φ−/Φ = 0.476 (the 187th damage in the list). This
has deep consequences on the best strategy to adopt in
a protection policy. In fact, a node with a large degree is
immediately recognized as a major channel of communi-
cation, being very visible since in direct contact to many
other nodes [13]. On the other hand, Infonet is a typical
example in which the crucial components, i.e. the nodes
to protect from the attacks, are not the hubs, but less
visible and apparently minor nodes.
Our results imply either an intense policy of protection
of the critical links/nodes from attacks, or a strategic ex-
pansion of the network with the addition of new links [2].
4TABLE III: Attacks and Improvement analysis of the MBTA.
Same as in table I. The letters in parenthesis indicate the
line/lines the stations belong to: R=red, G=green, GB=green
B, GC=green C, O=orange, B=blue.
Damaged link ∆Φ−/Φ
1 Park Street(RG)- Boylstone(G) 0.275
2 Boylstone(G) - Arlington(G) 0.270
3 Arlington(G) - Copley(G) 0.270
4 Copley(G) - Hynes(G) 0.256
5 Hynes(G) - Kenmore(G) 0.255
6 Kenmore(G) - Blandfor(G) 0.185
Damaged node ∆Φ−/Φ
1 Kenmore(G) 0.343
2 Copley(G) 0.333
3 Park Street(RG) 0.331
4 Boylstone(G) 0.285
5 Arlington(G) 0.281
6 Hynes(G) 0.266
Damaged couple of nodes ∆Φ−/Φ
1 Down. Cross.(RO) + Kenmore(G) 0.508
2 Park Street(RG) + Kenmore(G) 0.495
3 Down. Cross.(RO) + Copley(G) 0.465
4 Boylstone(G) + Kenmore(G) 0.444
Added Link ∆Φ+/Φ
1 Mount Hood(GB)- Dean (GC) 0.0390
2 Mount Hood(GB)- Tappan(GC) 0.0370
3 Washington(GB)- Tappan(GC) 0.0369
4 Washington(GB)- Dean (GC) 0.0368
5 Sutherland(GB)- Englewood(GC ) 0.0360
6 Mount Hood(GB)- Englewood(GC ) 0.0357
7 Sutherland(GB)- Dean (GC) 0.0355
We now investigate the best strategies to increase the per-
formance of the network by the addition of a new link.
The improvability of S under such a class of improve-
ments is I = 0.052. In the highest positions we find two
different classes of links: links connecting two IP pres-
ences in the US, and links connecting US and Europe
as Chicago-Amsterdam, NJersey-Amsterdam, Atlanta-
Amsterdam, Chicago-Frankfurt and Atlanta-Frankfurt.
A new link between Us and Europen, namely the link
Washington-Geneva, was in fact planned in the expan-
sion of Infonet 2001. Our method predicts that the in-
clusion of such a link increases by 2.5% the network per-
formance.
MBTA As a final example we cosider a transportation
system, the Boston subway, consisting of four lines, N =
124 stations and K = 125 tunnels [24]. Here the links
latency has been taken to be proportional to the time it
takes to go from a station to the next one. The results of
the analysis are in table III. The vulnerability V is equal
to 0.275,0.343,0.508, respectively for damages of single
links, single nodes or couples of nodes. The critical link
is Park Street - Boylstone. I is equal to 0.0390 with best
links to be added those connecting stations on the green
line B with stations on the green line C.
Summing up, in this paper we have proposed a new
general method to spot the critical components of a crit-
ical infrastructure system. With this method we are able
to identify the points of a network that are crucial to
the functioning of the infrastructure network, i.e. those
nodes and connections whose protection from terrorist at-
tacks must be assumed as the first concern of any national
policy. The method, used as an improvement analysis,
can also help to better shape an expansion of the net-
work. Other classes of critical infrastructure systems are
currently under study and will be presented in a future
work [19].
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